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The importance of such structures

  • 1 заключаться в том, что

    Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > заключаться в том, что

  • 2 заключаться в том, что

    Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > заключаться в том, что

  • 3 Grammar

       I think that the failure to offer a precise account of the notion "grammar" is not just a superficial defect in linguistic theory that can be remedied by adding one more definition. It seems to me that until this notion is clarified, no part of linguistic theory can achieve anything like a satisfactory development.... I have been discussing a grammar of a particular language here as analogous to a particular scientific theory, dealing with its subject matter (the set of sentences of this language) much as embryology or physics deals with its subject matter. (Chomsky, 1964, p. 213)
       Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of his language are necessarily accurate. (Chomsky, 1965, p. 8)
       Much effort has been devoted to showing that the class of possible transformations can be substantially reduced without loss of descriptive power through the discovery of quite general conditions that all such rules and the representations they operate on and form must meet.... [The] transformational rules, at least for a substantial core grammar, can be reduced to the single rule, "Move alpha" (that is, "move any category anywhere"). (Mehler, Walker & Garrett, 1982, p. 21)
       4) The Relationship of Transformational Grammar to Semantics and to Human Performance
       he implications of assuming a semantic memory for what we might call "generative psycholinguistics" are: that dichotomous judgments of semantic well-formedness versus anomaly are not essential or inherent to language performance; that the transformational component of a grammar is the part most relevant to performance models; that a generative grammar's role should be viewed as restricted to language production, whereas sentence understanding should be treated as a problem of extracting a cognitive representation of a text's message; that until some theoretical notion of cognitive representation is incorporated into linguistic conceptions, they are unlikely to provide either powerful language-processing programs or psychologically relevant theories.
       Although these implications conflict with the way others have viewed the relationship of transformational grammars to semantics and to human performance, they do not eliminate the importance of such grammars to psychologists, an importance stressed in, and indeed largely created by, the work of Chomsky. It is precisely because of a growing interdependence between such linguistic theory and psychological performance models that their relationship needs to be clarified. (Quillian, 1968, p. 260)
       here are some terminological distinctions that are crucial to explain, or else confusions can easily arise. In the formal study of grammar, a language is defined as a set of sentences, possibly infinite, where each sentence is a string of symbols or words. One can think of each sentence as having several representations linked together: one for its sound pattern, one for its meaning, one for the string of words constituting it, possibly others for other data structures such as the "surface structure" and "deep structure" that are held to mediate the mapping between sound and meaning. Because no finite system can store an infinite number of sentences, and because humans in particular are clearly not pullstring dolls that emit sentences from a finite stored list, one must explain human language abilities by imputing to them a grammar, which in the technical sense is a finite rule system, or programme, or circuit design, capable of generating and recognizing the sentences of a particular language. This "mental grammar" or "psychogrammar" is the neural system that allows us to speak and understand the possible word sequences of our native tongue. A grammar for a specific language is obviously acquired by a human during childhood, but there must be neural circuitry that actually carries out the acquisition process in the child, and this circuitry may be called the language faculty or language acquisition device. An important part of the language faculty is universal grammar, an implementation of a set of principles or constraints that govern the possible form of any human grammar. (Pinker, 1996, p. 263)
       A grammar of language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs.... Similarly a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (observations), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (laws) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (hypothetical constructs). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the infinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (predictions). (Chomsky, 1957, p. 49)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Grammar

  • 4 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 5 dicho

    adj.
    the aforementioned, aforementioned, this, aforesaid.
    intj.
    I meant what I said.
    m.
    saying, adage, aphorism, byword.
    past part.
    past participle of spanish verb: decir.
    * * *
    1 saying, proverb
    ————————
    1→ link=decir decir
    1 said, mentioned
    ■ dicha casa... the said house...
    1 saying, proverb
    1 betrothal sing
    \
    del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho there's many a slip twixt cup and lip, it's easier said than done
    dicho de otro modo to put it another way, in other words
    dicho sea de paso let it be said in passing
    dicho y hecho no sooner said than done
    lo dicho what we (I, you, etc) said
    propiamente dicho,-a strictly speaking
    * * *
    noun m.
    * * *
    1.
    VB [pp] de decir

    o dicho de otro modo... — or, putting it another way,..., or, in other words...

    bueno, lo dicho — OK, then

    • dejar algo dicho, le dejó dicho lo que tenía que hacer antes de irse — she gave him instructions as to what he should do before leaving

    • o mejor dicho — or rather

    • dicho sea de paso — incidentally, by the way

    propiamente 1)
    2.
    ADJ (=este) this

    quieren reformar la ley y para dicho propósito... — they wish to reform the law and to this end...

    y en la cuarta de dichas cartas... — and in the fourth of these letters...

    vamos a hablar de Cáceres: dicha ciudad fue construida en... — and now we come to Caceres: the city was built in...

    dicha compañía fue disuelta en 1994 — this o the said company was dissolved in 1994

    3. SM
    1) (=máxima popular) saying
    2) (=comentario) remark
    3) pl dichos (Rel) betrothal pledge
    * * *
    I
    - cha participio pasado [ver tb decir 2]

    dicho esto, se fue — having said this, he left

    bueno, lo dicho, nos vemos el domingo — oright, that's settled then, I'll see you on Sunday

    eso no se hace, te lo tengo dicho — I've told you before, you mustn't do that

    ¿le quiere dejar algo dicho? — (CS) do you want to leave a message for her?

    dicho de otro modo — to put it another way, in other words

    dicho sea de paso — incidentally, by the way

    dijo que ella lo prepararía y dicho y hecho! en diez minutos estaba listo — she said she would get it ready and, sure enough, ten minutes later there it was

    me quedan tres días, mejor dicho, dos y medio — I have three, or rather, two and a half days left

    II
    - cha adjetivo demostrativo (frml)

    en dichas cuidades... — in these cities...

    dichos documentos deben presentarse inmediatamente — the above o (frml) said documents must be submitted immediately

    III
    masculino saying

    del dicho al hecho va or hay mucho trecho — it's one thing to say something and another to actually do it

    * * *
    I
    - cha participio pasado [ver tb decir 2]

    dicho esto, se fue — having said this, he left

    bueno, lo dicho, nos vemos el domingo — oright, that's settled then, I'll see you on Sunday

    eso no se hace, te lo tengo dicho — I've told you before, you mustn't do that

    ¿le quiere dejar algo dicho? — (CS) do you want to leave a message for her?

    dicho de otro modo — to put it another way, in other words

    dicho sea de paso — incidentally, by the way

    dijo que ella lo prepararía y dicho y hecho! en diez minutos estaba listo — she said she would get it ready and, sure enough, ten minutes later there it was

    me quedan tres días, mejor dicho, dos y medio — I have three, or rather, two and a half days left

    II
    - cha adjetivo demostrativo (frml)

    en dichas cuidades... — in these cities...

    dichos documentos deben presentarse inmediatamente — the above o (frml) said documents must be submitted immediately

    III
    masculino saying

    del dicho al hecho va or hay mucho trecho — it's one thing to say something and another to actually do it

    * * *
    dicho1
    1 = adage, dictum [dicta, -pl.], utterance, wise saying, old saying, saying, saw, refrain.

    Ex: But now she was beginning to wonder if there was any truth to the old adage that 'It's not what you know, but who you know'.

    Ex: John Ward's dictum was that 'deprivation is as much a lack of information and the knowledge to use it as it is of the basic essentials'.
    Ex: One natural strategy for reducing the impact of miscommunication is selective verification of the user utterance meanings.
    Ex: Stories range from one-sentence statements we call jokes and wise sayings, through gossip to the most profound and complicated structures we call novels and poems and plays.
    Ex: Chapters include drinking and moonshine, courting, old cures and remedies, fishing and hunting, plus a chapter of pithy quotes and old sayings.
    Ex: 'Practice makes perfect' is a saying that can be applied to reading.
    Ex: And his life confirms the famous old saw: No man is a prophet in his own land.
    Ex: The importance of the right to information or the right to know is an increasingly constant refrain in the mouths of academics, the media and governments.
    * como dice el dicho = as the saying goes, so the saying goes.
    * del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho = easier said than done, There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip.
    * dicho bíblico = biblical saying.
    * dicho familiar = familiar saying.
    * dicho favorito = catchphrase.
    * dicho gracioso = witticism, quip.
    * dicho ingenioso = witticism, quip.
    * dicho popular = adage, wise saying, old saying, saying, familiar saying, saw.
    * dicho preferido = catchphrase.
    * dicho sin hecho no tiene provecho = actions speak louder than words.
    * dichos sabios = nuggets of wisdom.
    * entre el dicho y el hecho hay un gran tr = There's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip.
    * entre el dicho y el hecho hay un gran trecho = many a slip between the cup and the lip.

    dicho2
    2 = stated.

    Ex: Throughout, the code is based upon clearly stated principles.

    * bien dicho = amen to that!.
    * cuatro verdades bien dichas = home truth.
    * del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho = actions speak louder than words, many a slip between the cup and the lip.
    * dicho anteriormente, lo = foregoing, the.
    * dicho de otro modo = in other words, said differently.
    * dicho esto = that said.
    * dicho más arriba, lo = foregoing, the.
    * dicho sea a su favor = to + Posesivo + credit.
    * dicho sea de paso = by the way, on a sidenote, by the by(e).
    * dicho sucintamente = economically told.
    * dicho y hecho = no sooner said than done.
    * la verdad sea dicha = to tell the truth.
    * la verdad sea dicha que = if the truth be told.
    * o mejor dicho = or rather.
    * propiamente dicho = proper, properly.
    * ¿Qué ha dicho? = I beg your pardon?.
    * título propiamente dicho = title proper.
    * verdaderamente dicho = in disguise.

    dicho3
    = such.

    Ex: Preferential relationships generally indicate preferred terms or descriptors and distinguish such terms from non-descriptors or non-preferred terms.

    * * *
    pp
    [ ver tb decir2 (↑ decir (2)) ] dicho esto, recogió sus cosas y abandonó la sala having said this o ( frml) so saying, he picked up his things and left the room
    con eso queda todo dicho that says it all
    me remito a lo dicho en la última reunión I refer to what was said at the last meeting
    bueno, lo dicho, nos vemos el domingo right, that's settled then, I'll see you on Sunday
    eso no se hace, te lo tengo dicho how often do I have to tell you not to do that?, I've told you before, you mustn't do that
    ¿le quiere dejar algo dicho? (CS); do you want to leave a message for her?
    dicho así parece fácil if you put it like that it sounds easy
    dicho de otro modo to put it another way, in other words
    dicho sea de paso incidentally, by the way
    y, dicho sea de paso, se portó muy bien con él and, I have to say o it has to be said, she was very good to him
    y ella, que dicho sea de paso todavía me debe los 500 pesos, … and she, who incidentally still owes me the 500 pesos, …
    dijo que ella lo prepararía y ¡dicho y hecho! en diez minutos estaba listo she said she would get it ready and, what do you know? o ( BrE) hey presto, ten minutes later there it was
    yo dije que se iba a caer y ¡dicho y hecho! se hizo añicos I said it was going to fall and, the next minute, it smashed o and, no sooner had I said it than it smashed
    me quedan tres días, mejor dicho, dos y medio I have three, or rather, two and a half days left
    propiamente dicho strictly speaking
    no es un cereal propiamente dicho it is not, strictly speaking, a cereal
    la pintura cubista propiamente dicha Cubist painting in the strict sense of the term
    ( frml):
    excepto en Guayaquil y Quito: en dichas ciudades … except in Guayaquil and Quito: in these cities …
    dichos documentos deben presentarse inmediatamente the above documents must be submitted immediately, said documents must be submitted immediately ( frml)
    no existía dicha dirección there was no such address
    saying
    como dice el dicho as the saying goes
    del dicho al hecho va or hay mucho trecho it's one thing to say something and another to actually do it, there's many a slip twixt cup and lip
    * * *

     

    Del verbo decir: ( conjugate decir)

    dicho es:

    el participio

    Multiple Entries:
    decir    
    dicho
    decir 1 sustantivo masculino:
    ◊ ¿cientos de personas? — bueno, es un dicho hundreds of people? — well, figuratively speaking

    decir 2 ( conjugate decir) verbo transitivo
    1
    a) ‹palabra/frase/poema› to say;

    ‹mentira/verdad› to tell;
    para ejemplos con complemento indirecto ver división 2

    ¿eso lo dices por mí? are you referring to me?;
    ¡no lo dirás en serio! you can't be serious!;
    dijo que sí con la cabeza he nodded;
    no se dice `andé', se dice `anduve' it isn't `andé', it's `anduve';
    ¡eso no se dice! you mustn't say that!;
    ¿cómo se dice `amor' en ruso? how do you say `love' in Russian?;
    ¿lo encontró? — dice que sí/no did he find it? — he says he did/he didn't
    b)


    2 dichole algo a algn to tell sb sth;
    ◊ voy a dichole a papá que … I'm going to tell Dad …;

    ¡ya te lo decía yo! I told you so!
    3
    a) (expresando órdenes, deseos, advertencias):

    ◊ ¡porque lo digo yo! because I say so!;

    harás lo que yo diga you'll do as I say;
    dice que llames cuando llegues she says (you are) to phone when you get there;
    dijo que tuviéramos cuidado she said to be careful;
    diles que empiecen tell them to start;
    le dije que no lo hiciera I told him not to do it
    b)


    4
    a) (opinar, pensar) to think;


    ¡quién lo hubiera dicho! who would have thought o believed it?;
    es muy fácil — si tú lo dices … it's very easy — if you say so …
    b) (sugerir, comunicar):


    ¿te dice algo ese nombre? does that name mean anything to you?
    5
    ◊ querer decir [palabra/persona] to mean;

    ¿qué quieres dicho con eso? what do you mean by that?
    6 ( en locs)

    como quien dice so to speak;
    es decir that is;
    ¡he dicho! that's that o final!;
    ni que decir tiene que … it goes without saying that …;
    ¡no me digas! no!, you're kidding o joking! (colloq);
    por así decirlo so to speak;
    el qué dirán (fam) what other people (might) think;
    ver tb dicho 1
    verbo intransitivo

    ◊ papá — dime, hijo dad — yes, son?;

    quería pedirle un favor — usted dirá I wanted to ask you a favor — certainly, go ahead
    b) (Esp) ( al contestar el teléfono): ¿diga? or ¿dígame? hello?

    decirse verbo pronominal
    a) ( refl) to say … to oneself

    b) ( recípr) to say …. to each other;


    dicho 1
    ◊ - cha pp ver tb decir 2: dicho esto, se fue having said this, he left;

    con eso queda todo dicho that says it all;
    dicho de otro modo to put it another way, in other words;
    dicho sea de paso incidentally, by the way;
    y ¡dicho y hecho! en diez minutos estaba listo and, sure enough, ten minutes later there it was
    ■ adj dem (frml): en dichas ciudades … in these cities …;
    dicha información that information;
    dichos documentos (en escrito, documento) the above o (frml) said documents
    dicho 2 sustantivo masculino
    saying
    decir
    I m (dicho, sentencia) saying: es sólo un decir, it's just a manner of speaking
    II verbo transitivo
    1 to say: está diciendo una mentira/la verdad, she's telling a lie/the truth
    no dijo nada, he said nothing
    2 (con complemento indirecto) to tell: no le dije mi opinión, I didn't tell him my opinion
    les dijo que esperaran un rato, she told them to wait for a while
    3 (opinar, afirmar, proponer) ¿qué me dices de mi nuevo corte de pelo?, what do you think of my new haircut?, te digo que es una extravagancia, I think it's quite weird
    yo digo que vayamos a Cuenca, I suggest going to Cuenca
    4 (suscitar interés, una idea) to mean, appeal: ese libro no me dice nada, that book doesn't appeal to me
    ¿le dice algo esta cara?, does this face mean anything to you?
    5 (mostrar, indicar) to say, show: lo que hizo dice mucho en su favor, what he did says a lot for him
    su cara de decepción lo dice todo, his long face says it all
    ♦ Locuciones: Tel Esp diga o dígame, hello?
    digamos, let's say
    digo yo, in my opinion
    el qué dirán, what people will say
    es decir, that is (to say)
    ni que decir tiene, needless to say
    no decir esta boca es mía, not to say a word
    ¡no me digas!, really!
    por así decirlo, as it were o so to speak
    querer decir, to mean
    ¡y que lo digas!, you bet! ➣ Ver nota en mean
    ¿To tell     o to say?
    Observa que to tell menciona a la persona a la cual va dirigida una frase: Dime tu nombre. Tell me your name. Les dijo que se fueran. He told them to go away.
    Por el contrario, to say se centra en el contenido del mensaje, sin importarnos a quién va dirigido: ¿Qué has dicho? What did you say? Dijo que sí. He said yes. ➣ Ver nota en tell.
    dicho,-a
    I adjetivo
    1 said, mentioned: ya os lo tengo dicho, I've told you before
    dicho de otro modo, in other words
    2 (mencionado con anterioridad) dicha publicación, the above-mentioned publication
    II m (refrán, sentencia) saying
    ♦ Locuciones: dicho y hecho, no sooner said than done
    mejor dicho, or rather

    ' dicho' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    actual
    - bastar
    - ciudad
    - coña
    - coordinador
    - coordinadora
    - decir
    - dejar
    - desvarío
    - dicha
    - diversa
    - diverso
    - frase
    - maldad
    - mamarrachada
    - molesta
    - molesto
    - mu
    - necedad
    - picardía
    - propiamente
    - reafirmarse
    - sentencia
    - tal
    - tata
    - tener
    - vez
    - arrepentido
    - bien
    - cómo
    - deber
    - estupidez
    - haber
    - impertinencia
    - indiscreción
    - ingenioso
    - injusticia
    - insensatez
    - insolencia
    - lengua
    - ligereza
    - limitar
    - majadería
    - mejor
    - mentiroso
    - mirar
    - mucho
    - negar
    - paso
    - pavada
    English:
    actual
    - bird
    - but
    - do
    - proper
    - rather
    - recollect
    - said
    - say
    - saying
    - should
    - soon
    - take back
    - what
    - witticism
    - word
    - go
    - hear
    - message
    - ought
    - point
    - something
    - well
    - wish
    * * *
    dicho, -a
    ♦ participio
    ver decir
    ♦ adj
    said, aforementioned;
    dichos individuos… the said o aforesaid individuals…;
    recibió un paquete, dicho paquete contenía… she received a parcel, and this parcel contained…;
    lo dicho no significa que… having said this, it does not mean (that)…;
    de lo dicho se desprende que… from what has been said one gathers that…;
    o mejor dicho or rather;
    dicho y hecho no sooner said than done;
    dejar dicho to leave word;
    dejé dicho que no me molestaran I left word that I was not to be disturbed;
    RP
    ¿quiere dejarle algo dicho? [al teléfono] can I take a message?;
    lo dicho: lo dicho, no voy a ir like I said, I'm not going to go;
    lo dicho, os veré en el cine ok then, I'll see you at the cinema
    ♦ nm
    saying;
    como dice o [m5]reza el dicho,… as the saying goes,…;
    del dicho al hecho hay mucho o [m5] un gran trecho there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip
    * * *
    I part → decir
    II adj said
    III m saying;
    del dicho al hecho hay gran trecho easier said than done
    * * *
    dicho, - cha adj
    : said, aforementioned
    dicho nm
    decir: saying, proverb
    * * *
    dicho n saying

    Spanish-English dictionary > dicho

  • 6 Coimbra, University of

       Portugal's oldest and once its most prestigious university. As one of Europe's oldest seats of learning, the University of Coimbra and its various roles have a historic importance that supersedes merely the educational. For centuries, the university formed and trained the principal elites and professions that dominated Portugal. For more than a century, certain members of its faculty entered the central government in Lisbon. A few, such as law professor Afonso Costa, mathematics instructor Sidônio Pais, anthropology professor Bernardino Machado, and economics professor Antônio de Oliveira Salazar, became prime ministers and presidents of the republic. In such a small country, with relatively few universities until recently, Portugal counted Coimbra's university as the educational cradle of its leaders and knew its academic traditions as an intimate part of national life.
       Established in 1290 by King Dinis, the university first opened in Lisbon but was moved to Coimbra in 1308, and there it remained. University buildings were placed high on a hill, in a position that
       physically dominates Portugal's third city. While sections of the medieval university buildings are present, much of what today remains of the old University of Coimbra dates from the Manueline era (1495-1521) and the 17th and 18th centuries. The main administration building along the so-called Via Latina is baroque, in the style of the 17th and 18th centuries. Most prominent among buildings adjacent to the central core structures are the Chapel of São Miguel, built in the 17th century, and the magnificent University Library, of the era of wealthy King João V, built between 1717 and 1723. Created entirely by Portuguese artists and architects, the library is unique among historic monuments in Portugal. Its rare book collection, a monument in itself, is complemented by exquisite gilt wood decorations and beautiful doors, windows, and furniture. Among visitors and tourists, the chapel and library are the prime attractions to this day.
       The University underwent important reforms under the Pombaline administration (1750-77). Efforts to strengthen Coimbra's position in advanced learning and teaching by means of a new curriculum, including new courses in new fields and new degrees and colleges (in Portugal, major university divisions are usually called "faculties") often met strong resistance. In the Age of the Discoveries, efforts were made to introduce the useful study of mathematics, which was part of astronomy in that day, and to move beyond traditional medieval study only of theology, canon law, civil law, and medicine. Regarding even the advanced work of the Portuguese astronomer and mathematician Pedro Nunes, however, Coimbra University was lamentably slow in introducing mathematics or a school of arts and general studies. After some earlier efforts, the 1772 Pombaline Statutes, the core of the Pombaline reforms at Coimbra, had an impact that lasted more than a century. These reforms remained in effect to the end of the monarchy, when, in 1911, the First Republic instituted changes that stressed the secularization of learning. This included the abolition of the Faculty of Theology.
       Elaborate, ancient traditions and customs inform the faculty and student body of Coimbra University. Tradition flourishes, although some customs are more popular than others. Instead of residing in common residences or dormitories as in other countries, in Coimbra until recently students lived in the city in "Republics," private houses with domestic help hired by the students. Students wore typical black academic gowns. Efforts during the Revolution of 25 April 1974 and aftermath to abolish the wearing of the gowns, a powerful student image symbol, met resistance and generated controversy. In romantic Coimbra tradition, students with guitars sang characteristic songs, including Coimbra fado, a more cheerful song than Lisbon fado, and serenaded other students at special locations. Tradition also decreed that at graduation graduates wore their gowns but burned their school (or college or subject) ribbons ( fitas), an important ceremonial rite of passage.
       The University of Coimbra, while it underwent a revival in the 1980s and 1990s, no longer has a virtual monopoly over higher education in Portugal. By 1970, for example, the country had only four public and one private university, and the University of Lisbon had become more significant than ancient Coimbra. At present, diversity in higher education is even more pronounced: 12 private universities and 14 autonomous public universities are listed, not only in Lisbon and Oporto, but at provincial locations. Still, Coimbra retains an influence as the senior university, some of whose graduates still enter national government and distinguished themselves in various professions.
       An important student concern at all institutions of higher learning, and one that marked the last half of the 1990s and continued into the next century, was the question of increased student fees and tuition payments (in Portuguese, propinas). Due to the expansion of the national universities in function as well as in the size of student bodies, national budget constraints, and the rising cost of education, the central government began to increase student fees. The student movement protested this change by means of various tactics, including student strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations. At the same time, a growing number of private universities began to attract larger numbers of students who could afford the higher fees in private institutions, but who had been denied places in the increasingly competitive and pressured public universities.

    Historical dictionary of Portugal > Coimbra, University of

  • 7 Language

       Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)
       It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)
       It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)
       Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)
       It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)
       [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]
       Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it
       Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another
       LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)
       We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)
       We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.
       The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
       9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language
       The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)
       It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)
       In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)
       In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)
       [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)
       he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.
       The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)
       The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.
       But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)
       The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)
        t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)
       A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)
       Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)
       It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)
       First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....
       Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)
       If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)
        23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction
       Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)
       By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)
       Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language

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